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cannot be a fact in law which is not a fact in science; and it is
unfortunate that courts should maintain a contest with science and
the laws of nature, upon a question of fact which is within the
province of science and outside the domain of our law." See,
also, 1 Whart. Crim. Law. 148; 1 Bennett & Heard's Lead. Cas.
105-108; Commonwealth v; -Rogers, 7 Met. (Mass.) 500-506;
1 Russ. & Ry. Crown Cases 456; 4 Cox's Crown Cases 57.
This gradual change in the law of insanity has kept even pace
with the treatment offered in the asylums to those afflicted with
this disease. The monastic doctrine that the insane were possessed
with evil spirits and were to be treated as criminals, held sway for
many years after its founders had lost their control over the minds
of men. As the true nature of insanity became known, and it
was found to be a disease needing care and attention, the treatment
of those thus diseased and the laws as to their criminal responsibility became more humane, until to-day we find the insane treated
with a degree of kindness and consideration that was a stranger to
them at the time such celebrated lawyers as Lord COKE and Lord
IHALL said their criminal responsibility was to be measured with
that of the wild beasts, and when Hoga th gave us a representation
of the Bedlam of his day.
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Until Congress makes some regulation touching the liabilities of parties for
marine torts resulting in death of the persons injured, the statute of Indiana giving a right of action to the personal representatives of the deceased, where his
death is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, applies, the tort being
committed within the territorial limits of the state ; and as thus applied it constitutes no encroachment upon the commercial power of Congress.
The action of Congress as to a regulation of commerce or the liability for its
infringement, is exclusive of state authority ; but until some action is taken by
Congress, the legislation of a state not directed against commerce or any of its
regulations, but relating generally to the rights, duties and liabilities of citizens,
is of obligatory force within its territorial jurisdiction, although it may indirectly
and remotely affect the operations of foreign or %inter-state commerce, or persons
engaged in such commerce.
The Act of March 30th 1852, " to provide for the better security of the lives of
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passengers on hoard of vessels propelled in whole or part by steam, and for other
purposes," does not exempt the owners and masters of a stean vessel and the vesscl from liability for injuries caused by the negligence of its pilot or engineer, hut
makes them liable for all damages sustained by a passenger or his baggage from
any neglect to comply with the provisions of the law, no matter where the fault
may lie ; and in addition to this remedy, any person injured by th negligc'
of
the pilot or engineer may have his action directly against those officers.
The relation between the owner or master and pilot, as that of master and employee, is not changed by the fact that the selection of the pilot is limited to thosc
who have been found by examination to possess the requisite knowledge and skill,
and have been licensed by the government inspectors.

E RROR to the Supreme Court of Indiana.

In December 1868, the defendants (plaintiffs in error) were the
owners of a line of steamers employed in navigating the river Ohio
between Cincinnati, in Ohio, and Louisville, in Kentucky, for the
purpose of carrying passengers, freight and the United States mail.
On the fourth of that month, at night, two boats of the line, designated respectively as the United States and the America, collided
at a point on the river opposite the main land of the state of Indiana.
By the collision the hull of one of them was broken in, and a fire
started, which burned the boat to the water's edge, destroying it
and causing the death of one of its passengers by the name of Sappington, a citizen of Indiana. The administrator of the deceased
brought the present action for his death in one of the courts of Common Pleas of Indiana, under a statute of that state, which provides
"that when the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal representatives of the former may
maintain an action therefor against the latter, if the former might
have maintained an action, had he lived, against the latter for an
injury for the same act or omission."
The complaint in the action alleged that the collision occurred
within the territorial jurisdiction of Indiana, above the line of lowywater mark of the river, and charged it generally to the careless
And negligent navigation of the steamboat United States by the
defendant's servants and officers of the vessel, but especially to the
carelessness of the pilot, in running the same at too great a speed
down the stream; in giving the first signal to the approaching boat
as to the choice of sides of the river, contrary to the established custom of pilots navigating the Ohio, and the rules prescribed by the
Act of Congress ; and in not slackening the speed of the boat and
giving a signal of alarm and danger until it was too late to avoid
the collision.
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To defeat thi.; action the defendants relied upon substantially
the following grounds of defence: first, that the injuries complained
of occurred on the river Ohio beyond low-water imark on the Indiana side, and within the limits of the state of Kentucky ; and that
by a law of that state, an action for the death of a party from the
carelessness of another could only be brought within one year from
such death, which period had elapsed when the present action was
brought; and, 2d, that at the time of the alleged injuries, the colliding boats were engaged in carrying on inter-state commerce under
the laws of the United States, and the defendants, as their owners,
were not liable for the injuries occurring in their navigation through
the carelessness of their officers, except as prescribed by those laws;
and that these (lid not cover the liability asserted by the plaintiff
under the statute of Indiana.
T. D. Lincoln, for plaintiffs in error.
. A. Korbly, for defendants in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FIELD, J.-Under the first head no question is presented for consideration of which we can take cognisance. It is admitted that the
territorial limits of Indiana extend to low-water mark on the north
side of the river, and the jury found that the collision took place
above that mark. It is, therefore, of no moment to the defendants
that.the Supreme Court of Indiana held that the state possessed concurrentjurisdiction with Kentucky on the river, under the Act of the
Commonwealth of Virginia of 1789, providing for the erection of
the district of Kentucky into an independent state, and that the
legislation of Indiana could, for that reason, be equally enforced
with respect to any matters occurring on the river, as with respect to similar matters occurring within her territorial limits on
the land.
The questions for our consideration arise under the second head
of the defence. Under this head it is contended that the statute
of Indiana creates a new liability, and could not, therefore, be applied to cases where the injuries complained of were caused by
marine torts, without interfering with the exclusive regulation of
commerce vested in Congress. The position of the defendants, as
we understand it, is that as by both the common and maritime law
VOL. XXV.-58
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the right of action for personal torts dies with the person injured,
the statute which allows actions for such torts, when resulting in
the death of the person injured, to be brought by the per-oial representatives of the deceased, enlarges the liability of parties for
such torts, and that such enlarged liability, if applied to cases of
marine torts, would constitute a now burden upon commerce.
In supposed support of this position, numerous decisions of this
court are cited by counsel, to the effect- that the states cannot by
legislation, place burdens upon commerce with foreign nations or
among the several states. The decisions go to that extent, and
their soundness is not questioned. But upon an ext-nination of
the cases in which they were rendered it will be found that the
legislation adjudged invalid imposed a tax upon some instrument
or subject of commerce, or exacted a license fee from parties engaged in commercial pursuits, or created an impediment to the free
navigation of some public waters, or prescribed conditions in accordance with which commerce in particular articles or between particular places was required to be conducted. In all thQ cases the
legislation condemned operated directly upon commerce, either by
way of tax upon its business, license upon its pursuit in particular
channels, or conditions for carrying it on. Thus, in The Passenger.eases, 7 How. 445, the laws of New York and Massachusetts
exacted a tax frdm the captains of vessels bringing passengers from
foreign ports for every passefiger landed. In the Wheeling Bridge
case, 13 How. 518, the statute of Virginia authorized the erection of
a bridge, which was held to obstruct the free navigation of the
river Ohio. In the case of Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227,
the statute of Alabama required the owner of a steamer navigating
the waters of the state to file, before the boat left the port of Mobile, in the office of the probate judge of Mobile county, a statement in writing, setting forth the name of the vessel and of the
owner or owners, and his or their place of residence and interest
in the vessel, and prescribed penalties for neglecting the requirement. It thus imposed conditions for carrying on the coasting
trade in the waters of the state in addition to those prescribed
by Congress. And in all the other cases where legislation of a
state has been held to be null for interfering with the commercial
power of Congress, as in Brown v. .3laryland,12 Wheat. 425, the
Tonnage Tax cases, 12 Wallace 204, and Jrelton'v. iissouri, 1
Otto 275, the legislation created, in the way of tax, license, or con-
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dition, a direct burden upon commerce, or in some way directly
interfered with its freedom. In the present case no such operation
can be ascribed to the statute of Indiana. That statute imposes
no tax, prescribes no duty, and in no respect interferes with
any regulations' for the navigation and use of vessels. It only
declares a general principle, respecting the liability of all persons
within the jurisdiction of tlhe state for torts resulting in the death
of parties injured. And in the application of the principle it makes
no difference where the injury complained of becurred in the state,
whether on land or on water. General legislation of this kind
prescribing the liabilities or duties of citizens of a state, without
distinction as to pursuit or calling, is not open to any valid objection because it may affect persons engaged in foreign or inter-state
commerce. Objection might with equal propriety be urged against
legislation prescribing the form in which contracts shall be iuthenticated, or property descend or be distributed on the death of, its
owner, because applicable to the contracts or estates of persons engaged in such commerce. In conferring upon Congress the regalation of commerce, it was never intended to cut the states off from
legislating on all subjects relating to the health, life and safety of
their citizens, though the legislation might iridirectly affect the commerce of the country. Legislation in a great variety of ways may
affect commerce and persons engaged in it without constituting a
regulation of it, within the meaning of the Constitution.
It is true that the 'commercial power conferred by the Constitution is one without limitation. It authorizes legislation with respect
to all the subjects of foreign and inter-state commerce, the persons
engaged in it, and the instruments by which it is carried on. And
legislation has largely dealt, so far as commerce by water is concerned, with the instruments of that commerce. It has embraced
the whole subject of navigation, prescribed what shall constitute
American vessels, and by whom they shall be navigated; how they
shall be registered or enrolled and licensed; to what tonnage, hospital and other dues they shall be subjected; what rules they shall
obey in passing each other; and what provision their owners shall
make for the health, safety and comfort of their crews. Since
steam has been applied to the propulsion of vessels, legislation has
embraced an infinite variety of further details to guard against
accident and consequent loss of life.
The power to prescribe these and similar regulations necessarily
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involves the right to declare the liability which shall follow their
infraction. Whatever, therefore, Congress determines, either as to
a regulation or the liability for its infringement, is exclusive of
state authority. But with reference to a great variety of matters
touching the rights and liabilities of persons engaged in commerce,
eithler as owners or navigators of vessels, the laws of Congress are
silent, and the laws of the state govern. The rules for the acquisitiorf of property by persons engaged in navigation, and for its
transfer and descent, are, with some exceptions, those prescribed by
the state to which the vessels belong. And it may be said gererally, that the legislation of a state not directed against commerce
or any of its regulations, but relating to tle rights, duties and liabilities of citizens, and only indirectly and remotely affecting the
operations of commerce, is of obligatory force upon citizens within
its territorial jurisdiction, whether on land or water, or engaged in
commerce, foreign or inter-state, or in any other pursuit. In our
judgment, the statute of Indiana falls under this class. Until
Congress, therefore, makes some regulation touching the liability
of parties for marine torts resulting in the death of the persons
injured, we are of opinion that the statute of Indiana applies,
giving a right of action in such cases to the personal representatives
of the deceased, and that as thus applied it constitutes no encroachment upon the commercial power of Congress: United States v.
Bevans, 3 Wheat. 887.
In the case of The Steamboat Company v. Ckase, 16 Wallace,
this court sustained an action for a marine tort resulting in the
death of the party injured, in the name of the administrator of the
deceased, under a statute of Rhode Island, similar in its general
features to the one of Indiana. There the deceased was killed
whilst crossing Narraganset Bay in a sail-boat by collision with a
steamer of the company; and though objections were taken and
elaborately argued against the jurisdiction of the court, it was not
even suggested that the right of action conferred by the statute,
when applied to cases arising out of marine torts, in any way
infringed upon the commercial power of Congress.
In addition to the objection urged to the statute of Indiana, the
defendants also contended that as owners of the colliding vessels
they were exempt from liability to the deceased as a passenger on
one of them, and of course to his representatives, as the collision
was caused without any fault of theirs, by the negligence of the
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pilots ; and they relied upon the 30th section of the Act of Congress
of 'March 80th 1852, to provide for the better security of the lives'
of passengers on board of vessels propelled in whole or part by steam.

T hat act was in force when the injuries complained of in this case
were committed, and its principal features have been retained in
subsequeht legislation. The section provided "that whenever damage is sustained by any passenger or his baggage from explosion,
fire, collision, or other cause, the master and the owner of such vessel, or either of them, and the vessel, shall be liable to each and
every person so injured to the full amount of damage, if it happens
ifrotgh any neglect to conTly with the provisions of law hcreinprescribed, or through known defects or imperfections of the steaming
apparatus, or of the hull; and any person sustaining loss or injury
through the carelessness, negligence, or wilful misconduct of an engineer or pilot, or their neglect or refusal to obey the provisions of
law herein prescribed as to navigating such steamers, may sue such
engineer or pilot and recover damages for any such injury caused
as aforesaid by any such engineer or pilot :" 10 Statutes at
Large 72.
It was argued that by this section Congress intended the exemption claimed. And confirmation of this view was found in the fact
that the owners were obliged to take a pilot, and were restricted in
their choice to those licensed by the government inspectors. It was
supposed that the relation between owner and pilot, as that of master
and employee, was thus changed, and that with the change the
responsibility of the former for the negligence of the latter ceased.
The court, however, proceeded through the trial upon a different
theory of the position of the defendants. It held that as owners
they were responsible for the conduct of all the officers and employees
of the vessels, and that it was immaterial whether the vessels were
or not at the time of the collision under the exclusive charge of the
pilots. The instructions to the jury at least went to that extent.
They in substance declared that, if the collision occurred within the
territorial jurisdiction of Indiana, and was caused, without fault of
the deceased, by the carelessness or misconduct of the defendants,
or any of their agents, servants, or employees in navigating and
managing the steamers, or either of them, the plaintiff was entitled
to recover.
In support of the exemption the counsel of the defendants called
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to our attention a:n opinion of the Supreme Court of Kentucky iii
a similar case arising upon the same collision, where such exciiption was upheld. The opinion is marked by the usual ability which
characterizes the judgments ot that court, but after much hesitation
and doubt, we have been compelled to dissent from its conclusions.
The statute appears to us to declare that the owners and fhaster of
a steam-vessel, and the vessel itself, shall be liable for all damages
sustained by a passenger or his baggage from any neglect to comply with the provisions of the law, no matter where the fault may lie;
and that in addition to this remedy any person injured by the negligence of the pilot or engineer may have his action directly against
those officers.
The occasions upon which a pilot or engineer would be able to
respond to any considerable amount would be exceptional. The
statute of England, which exempts the owners of vessels and the
vessels from liability for faults of pilots, pilotage there being compulsory and pilots being licensed, has not met with much commendation from the admiralty courts, and the general tendency of their adjudications has been to construe the exemption with great strictness.
This course of decision is very fully stated in the exposition of the
law made by Mr. Justice SwiTNE in the case of Tiue kiina, 7 Wallace, where this court declined to hold that compulsory pilotage
relieved the vessel from liability. In the case of The HTalley, Law
Rep. 2 Adm. & Eccles. 15, decided as recently as 1867, Sir ROBERT
PHILLIBIORE strongly questioned the policy of the statute, and said
that it appeared to him difficult to reconcile the claims of natural
justice with the law, which exempted the owner who had a licensed
pilot on board from liability for the injuries done by the bad navigation of his vessel to the property of an innocent owner, and
observed that no one acquainted with the working of the law could
be ignorant that it was fruitful in injustice. The doctrine that the
owners are responsible for the acts of their agents and employees
ought not to be discarded because the selection of a pilot by the owner
is limited to those who by the state have been found by examination to
possess the requisite knowledge of the difficulties of local navigation
and the requisite skill to conduct a vessel through them. "As a general rule," says Mr. Justice GniER, in the case of The Creole, "masters of vessels are not expected to be and cannot be acquainted with
the rocks and shoals on every coast" (and we may add, with the
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currents and shoals of every rivbr), "nor able to conduct a vessel
safely into every port. Nor can the absent owners or their agent,
the master, be supposed capable of judging of the capacity of persons offering to serve as pilots. They need a servant, but are not
in a situation to test or judge of his qualifications, and have 'not,
therefore, the information necessary to choice. The pilot laws
kindly interfere and do that for the owners which they could not
do for themselves :" Smith v. The Creole, 2 Wall. Jr. 485. And the
learned justice observes, that in such cases where a pilot is required
to be taken from those licensed, the relation of master and servant
is not changed; that the pilot continues the servant of the owners,
acting in their employ and receiving wages for services rendered
to them, and that the fact that he is selected for them by persons
more capable of judging of his qualifications, cannot alter the
relation.
11
And in the case of The Halley, Sir ROBERT PHILLIMORE upon

this subject says: "I do not quite understand why, because the
state insists, on the one hand, upon all persons who exercise the
office of pilo, within certain districts, being duly educated for the
purpose and having a certificate of their fitness, and insists, on the
other hand, that the master shall, within these districts, take one
of these persons on board to superintend the steering of his vessel,
the usual relation of owner and'servant is to be entirely at an end;
and still less do I see why the sufferer is to be deprived of all practical redress for injuries inflicted upon him by the ship which such
a pilot navigat.s."
By the common law the owners are responsible for the damages
committed by their vessel, without any reference to the particular
agent by whose negligence the injury was committed. By the
maritime law the vessel, as well as the owners, is liable to the
party injured for damages caused by its torts. By that law the
vessel is deemed to be an offending thing, and may be prosecuted
without any reference to the adjustment of responsibility between
the owners and enployees for the negligence which resulted in the
injury. Any departure from this liability of the owners or of the
vessel, except as the liability of the former may be released by a
surrender of the vessel, has been found in practice to work great
injustice. The statute ought to be very clear before we should conclude that any such departure was intended by Congress. The
section we have cited would not justify such a conclusion. Its
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language readily admits of the construction we have given, and
that construction is in harmony with the purposes of the act.
We are of opinion that the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Indiana was correct, and it is therefore affirmed.
In sect. 8, art. 1, of the Constitution,
there is conferred upon Congress the
power "To regulate commerce with
foreign nations and among the several
states and with the Indian tribes." It
produced perhaps the earliest conflicts
between State and Federal jurisdiction,
anti the cases which arose under it show
more able controversy at the bar and
disagreement upon the bench than any
in the United States reports. The admirable opinion of MARStALL, C. J.,
in the case of Gibbonsv. Ogden, 3 Wheat.
1, argued in the year 1824, by Webster, Wirt and others, was the first delivered upon the clause. The legislature of New York lhd conferred upon
certain persons the exclusive right of
navigating the waters of that state by
steam vessels. The owners of a steam
coaster duly licensed and enrolled under
the laws of the United States, to be employed in the coasting trade, were enjoined from navigating the waters of
-New York. The constitutionality of
the law was Sustained in all the state
courts, hut the Supreme Court of the
United States declared it repugnant to
the power to regulate commerce as actually carried out in the License Act.
"In discussing the question whether
this power is still in the states in the
case under consideration we may dismiss from it the inquiry whether it is
surrendered by the mere grant to Congress or is retained until Congress shall
exercise the power. We may dismiss
that inquiry because it has been exercised, and the regulations which Congress deemed it proper to make are now
in full operation :" p. 200. This case
was ies nova: not an authority, it is believed, was cited by the court, and it is
interesting as belonging to that class of

questions in which the earliest decision
may be said to have made and not
merely declared what was right. But
for many years two different constructions were put upon it by the ablest
members of the Federal court.
Brown v. The State ef .lar3nlaud, 12
Wheat. 419 (1827), argued by Meredith, Johnson, Taney and Wirt, the
opinion of the court being delivered by
MARSHALL, C. J., accompanied by a
dissent from TnomrsoN, J., is another
early constitutional landmark. The
state of Maryland had required all persons selling imported merchandise in
the original bale or package to pay a
license, and the court held the law unconstitutional, because it laid an impost, and also because it was a regulation of commerce in violation of
an existing regulation of the United
States, viz. : the Importation Laws;
which having conferred the right to import, conferred with it the right to sell.
As the law was held to be in violation
of an existing regulation of commerce
the court were saved, as in Gibbons v.
Ogden, from saying what would be the
case if Congress had made no regulation, but the subject was often referred
to in the argument, especially by Mr.
Taney,who never abandoned the opinion
which he then expressed.
In Willson v. The £lackbird Marsh
Cretk Co., 2 Pet. 250 (1829), the question was fairly raised, but the report of
the case shows very little of the elaboration and care that the discussion of
the principle deserved. The constitutionality of a lawv of the state of Delaware, authorizing certain persons to
build a dam in a small navigable stream
emptying into the river Delaware, was
before the court. MARSHALL, C. J.,

SHERLOCK v. ALLING.
sai, I,The value of the property on its
hanks must be enhanced by excluding
the water from the marsh, and the health
of the inhabitants probably improved.
M11easures calculated to produce these
object., providcd they do not come into
collision with the powers of the gen.ral
government, are undoubtedly within
thoic which are reserved to the states.
Bat the measure authorized by this act
stops a navigable creek, and must be
supposed to abridge the rights of those
who have been accustomed to use it.
But this abridgment, unless'it comes in
conflict with the "onstitution or a law
of tle United States, is an affair be.
tween the government of Delaware and
its citizens, of which this court can take
no cognisance.
- The counsel for the plaintiffs in error
insist that it comes in conflict with the
power of the United States I to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the several states.' If Congress
had passed any act which bore upon the
ease, any act in execution of that power
to regulate commerce, the object of
which was to control state legislation
over those small navigable creeks into
which the tide flows, and which abound
throughout the lower country of the
omiddle and southern states, we should
not feel much difficulty in saying that a
state law coming in conflict with such
act would be void. But Congress has
passed no such act." This case, evidently not much regarded at the time,
has proved the calculus of the courts.
One school contending that Ch. Justice
MARSHALL in it defined the opinion he
delivered in Gibbons v. Ogden, by holding that the power to regulate commerce
k only exclusive of the states when exercised and not when dormant; while
the other contended that the opinion, regarded in the light of the facts, meant
to say that such small navigable creeks
never were within the constitutional proVOL. XXV.-59

vision, and that therefore the state regulation of them, especially by laws intended to preserve the health of its
citizens, was above suspicion.
In NLcw Tork v. Miln,'11 Peters 151
(1837), the court held laws of New York
requiring masters of foreign vessels to
make certain reports on entering the
harbors constitutional, as an exercise of
police power and not a regulation of
commerce. TuomPsoN, J., delivered a
separate opinion, concurring in the reasoning of BABnOUR, J., who delivered
the opinion of the court, but taking
the further ground (which the court
determined to leave open as we learn
from TAtEY, C. J., in his opinion in
tile Passergcr Cases), that the legislation was perfectly constitutional, even
as : regulation of commerce, Congress not having exercised its power in
conflict with the law. Judge STORY
delivered a dissenting opinion, founded
on Gibbons v. Ogden and Brown v. The

State of faryland, which he considered
to establish the doctrine, that the power
to regulate commerce is exclusive of
the states. "In this opinion I have the
consolation to know that I had the entire concurrence upon the same grounds
of that great constitutional jurist tha
late Mr. Chief Justice M1A SHALL.
Having heard the former argaments his
deliberate opinion was that the Act of
New York was unconstitutional ; and
that the present case fell directly within
the principles established in the case of
Gibbons v. Ogden and Brown v .The
State of Marijlund." He differed from
THomrsoN, J., in everything but from
the opinion expressed by the court only
in holding the acts to be regulations of
commerce; because he did not doubt
that the states would properly exercise
what are called police powers, if they
did not come into conflict with actually
existing commercial regulations of
Congress.
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In Te License Cases, 5 How. 504
(1847), certain laws of Massachusetts,
Rhode Island and Now Hampshire, prohibiting the sale of liquor under certain
gross amounts without a license, were
held constitutional as a proper exercise
of the reserved power of the states, and
not in conflict with the general power
of Congress to regulate commerce.
The states having a right to regulate
their internal traffic
of retailing liquor
these acts did not fall within Brown v.
The State ofj Maryland, because they
did not regulate the sale of liquors in
the original package or as imported,
but when they had become mingled with
tle general property of the state, and
were offered for retail sale. The facts
of the case presented under the law of
New Hampshire made it more doubtful.
A barrel of gin had been purchased by
a merchant of Dover in Boston, and sold
by him in New Hampshire in the cask
in which it was imported. Therefore
the very same question was raised as to
commerce between the states that arose
in Brown v. The State of Mfaryland, as
to commerce with foreign nations.
TANE , C. J., distinguished the cases
on the ground that Congress had
actually regulated commerce with foreign nations by importation laws, while
no laws had been passed to regulate
trade between the states. He said :
" It is well known that upon this subject a difference of opinion has existed
and still exists among the members of
this court. But with every respect fdr
the opinion of my brethren with whom
I do not agree, it appears to me to be
very clear that the mere grant of power
to the general government, cannot upon
any just principles of construction be
construed to be an absolute prohibition
to the exercise of any power over the
same subject by the states. The controlling and supreme power over commerce with foreign nations and the
several states is undoubtedly conferred

upon Congress. Yet in my judgment
the state may nevertheless, for the safety
or convenience of trade or for the protection of the health of itscitizens,
make regulations of commerce for its
own ports and harbors, and for its
own territory ; and such regulations
are valid unless they come in coaflict
with a law of Congress :" p. 579.
Other justices, as McLE.t. Woon nuny
and GREn, preferred to sustain these
laws as an exercise of the police power
of the respective states, and not as
regulations of commerce.
The Passenyer

Cases, 7

How.

283

(1849),

brought out all tileslumbering differences. Tile question before the court
was the constitutionality of certain
statutes of New York and Massachusetts imposing taxes upon alien passengers arriving in the ports of those
states. The case was argued at the
greatest iength by Webster, Choate,
Ogden, Van Buren, Davis and others,
and the judges delivered seriatim
opinions. McLEAN, WAriNS, CATRON,
GatErt and ]McKINLEY held the laws
unconstitutional. They concurred in
holding the power of Congress to
regulate commerce to be exclusive, and
that tihe acts in question amounted to a
regulation of commerce, while TA E ,
C. J., and DANIEL, NELSON and WooDBuny, JJ., considered the power to
regulate commerce not exclusive, and
that the acts in question were police
and not commercial regulations. In
Cooley v. The Board of Port W1'ardens,
12 How. 300 (1851), pilot laws of
tile
state of Pennsylvania were held to
be regulations of commerce, and yet
constitutional because Congress had not
legislated upon the subject. CURTIS,
J., delivered the opinion of the court.
He said "entertaining these views we
are brought directly and unavoidably to
the consideration of the question
whether the grant of the commercial
power to Congress did per se deprive
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the states of all power to regulate pilots.
This question has never been decided
by this court nor in our judgment has
any case depending upon all the considerations which must govern this one
come before this court. The grant of
commercial power to Congress does not
contain any terms which expressly dxelude the states from exercising an
authority over its subject-matter. If
they ai'e excluded it must be because
the nature of the power thus granted to
Congress requires that a similar authority should not exist in the states.
If it were conceded on the one side that
the nature of this power, like that to
legislate for the District of Columbia,
is absolutely and totally repugnant to
the existence of similar power in the
states, probably no one would deny that
the grant of the power to Congress as
effectually and perfectly excludes the
the states from all future legislation on
the subject as if express words had
been used to exclude them. And on
the other hand, if it were admitted that
the existence of this power in Congress,
like the power of taxation, is compatible
with the existence of a similar power
in the states, then it would be in conformity with the contemporary exposi.
tion of the Constitution (Federalist, No.
32), and with the judicial construction
given from time to time by this court,
after the most deliberate consideration,
to hold that the mere grant of such a
power to Congress did not imply a prohibition upon the states to exercise the
same power; that it is not the mere
existence of such a power, but its exercise by Congress which may be incompatible with the exercise of the same
power by the states, and that the states
may legislate in the absence of congressional regulations : Sturqs v. Crowninshde1d, 4 Wheat. 193 ; Moore v. Hous.
ton, 5 Id. I; If lson v. Blackbird
Crede Co., 2 Pet. 251. The court carefully confined the decision to the particular case of pilot laws. McLEAN, J.,

dissented, on the ground that the power
in Congress was exclusive of the states.
This was the first instance in which a
state law admitted to be a regulation
of commerce was held to be constitutional.
Then came The Wheeling Bridge
Case, 13 How. 519 (1851), argued by
Mr. Stanton, Mr. Johnson and others.
The state of Virginia had authorized
the construction of a bridge over the
Ohio, which impeded the navigation
of the river. It was contended that
this was an infringement of the
right of Congress to regulate comMcLEAN, J., delivered the
merce.
Ile said that
opinion of the court.
Congress had regulated the subject.
"1Congress have not declared in terms
that a state by the construction of
bridges or otherwise shall not obstruct
the navigation of the Ohio, but they
have regulated upon it as before remarked by licensing vessels, establishing ports of entry, imposing duties on
masters and other officers of boats, and
inflicting severe penalties for neglect of
those duties by which damage to life or
property has resulted, and they have
expressly mentioned the compact made
by Virginia with Kentucky at the time
of its admission into the Union, that
the use and navigation of the river
Ohio, so far as the territory of the proposed state or the territory that shall
remain within the limits of this Commonwealth lies thereon, shall be free
and common to the citizens of the
United States. Now an obstructed navigation cannot be said to be free :"
p. 565. But TANEY, C. J. and DANIEL,
J., dissenting, maintained that Congress, not having legislated upon the
subject of the obstruction of navigable
streams, or the height of bridges, the
statute of Virginia was complete justification to the company. They relied
upon ll7lson v. The Blackbird Creek
Co., as an exactly similar case, and it
is difficult to see why it is not so. Me-
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LE.,x, J., in the Passenger Czses, said in a very powerful dissent, considered
of it: , It must he admitted that tile that the regulation of commerce on the
language of the eminent chief justice Schuylkill was quite as substantial as
who wrote the opinion is less guarded that on the Ohio. NELSON, J., did not
than his opinions generally were on con- sit, so that the judges who were on the
bench when The Wheeling Bridge Case
stitutional questions :" p. 397. "The
construction of the dam was complained was decided and who concurred with
the majority in that case, differed in
of, not as a regulation of commerce,
but an obstruction of it; and the court opinion in this one. This was followed
held that as Congress had not assumed by the State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12
to control state legislation over those Wall. 204 (1870), and Ex parte Menavigable creeks into which the tide Nel, 13 Id. 240 (1871). The principle
flows, the judicial power could not do may be now regarded as fixed that the
so. The act of the state was an in- commercial power of Congress is not
ternal and a police power to guard the necessarily exclusive of the states. In
health of its citizens. By the erection each particular instance it must be inof the dam commerce could only be quired whether the subject regulated is
affected as charged consequentially and of such a nature as to require federal
contingently. The state neither as- and to exclude state regulation.
In Wdlon v. The State of Missouri,
sumed nor exercised a commercial
power :" p. 398. In this case he dis- I Otto 278, a law requiring persons
carrying goods not the growth, product
posed of it by saying : " The Chief
Justice said it was a matter of doubt or manufacture of the state from place
whether the small creeks which the tide to place within it for sale to pay a
makes navigable a short distance, are license, was held unconstitutional.
within the general commercialrregula- FIELD, J., said "so far as some of these
tions, and that in such cases of doubt it instruments are concerned and some
would be better for the court to follow subjects which are local in their operathe lead of Congress. Congress have tion, it has been held that the states may
led inregulating commerce on the Ohio, provide regulations until Congress acts
which brings the case within the rule with reference to them ; but when the
laid down :" p. 566. It appears to us subject to which the power applies is
impossible to read the now noted case, national in its character, or of such a
and admit such an explanation of it. nature as to admit of uniformity of
These cases were followed by Smith v. regulation, the power is exclusive of all
Davenport, 22 How. 227 (1859), and state authority :" p. 280. As commerce between the states is of national
Gihnan v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713
(1865). The latter is interesting be- character and admits of uniformity of
regulation the power of Congress over
cause it divided the court. The constitutionality of the law of Pennsyl- it is exclusive. Its inaction is equivavania authorizing the construction of the lent to a declaration that inter-state
Chestnut street bridge across the Schuyl- commerce shall he free. If there be
kill river at Philadelphia, was before any rule at all upon the subject, this
the court. The majority distinguished case states it and in a form which is a
it from the Wheeling Bridge Case on the practical adoption of the views of
ground that Congress had notregulated TANrT, C. J., as opposed to those so
commerce on the Schuylkill river, and tenaciously held by STORY and Mcconsidered it governed by Wilson v. LEAN, JJ. Chief Justice MARSHALL,
The Blackbird Marsh Creek Co.; while in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat.
CLIFFOXUD, WAYNE and DAVIs, JJ., 193, in holding that the states might
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conztitutionally pass bankrupt acts in
absence of general legislation upon the
subject by Congress, expressed what
now appears to be the true rule for construing all the powqrs conferred upon
Congress. "Whenever the terms in
which a power is granted to Congress
and the nature of the power require
that it should be exercised exclusively
by Congress, the subject is as completely taken from the state legislatures
as if they had been expressly forbidden
to act upon it."
It does not appear from the opinion
in the principal case or from the report
of it in 44 Ind. 185, what the arguments of counsel were.
It appears to have been found by the
jury that the death of Sappington, the
plaintiff's intestate, was caused by the
negligence of the pilot of the steamer
United States, which was burned and
sunk in the collision.
The United
States was a passenger steamer, engaged
in inter-state commerce, and 'licensed
under the Act of August aoth 1852,
" to provide for the better security of
the lives of passengers on board of
vessels propelled in whole or in part by
steam and for other purposes." The
act regulates most carefully the equipment of steam passenger vessels as to
their boilers, engines, decks, hulls,
hose, pumpq, axes, life-preservers ; provides rules for passing, makes pilotage
compulsory, &c. No license is to be
granted until the provisions of the act
arc complied with. The pilot was
regularly licensed under the act. The
30th sect. is as follows : "And be it
further enacted, that whenever damage
is sustained by any passenger or his
baggage from explosion, fire, collision
or other cause, the master and the
owner of such vessel or either of them
and the vessel shall be liable to
each and every person so injured to the
fall amount of damage if it happens
through any neglect to comply with the
provisions of the law herein prescribed

or through known defects or imperfections of the steaming apparatus or of the
hull ; and any person sustaining loss or
injury through the carelessness, negligence or wilful misconduct of an engineer, or pilot, or their neglect or refusal to obey the provisions of law herein prescribed as to navigating such
steamers may sue such engineer or pilot
and recover damages for any such
injury caused as aforesaid by any such
engineer or pilot:" 10 Statutes at
Large 72.
-By the maritime law the responsibility of the owners is limited to the
value of the ship and freight. The
vessel is regarded as a responsible
thing bound for the performance of the
contracts of the master, and to make
good the consequences of his acts: Tie
.ebecca., Ware 188; The Phcebe, Ware
263. Hence if the owners abandon a
vessel and freight, or if they be exhausted by the claims there remains
no further remedy against them personally.
The proceedings were always in ren.
But it will be seen that the liability of
the owners of steam passenger vessels
is greatly increased by the act in question so that in certain contingencies
they are personally responsible for the
whole amount of damage.
The first ground taken by the plaintiff in error was that the law of Indiana
interfered with the license conferred by
the Act of 1852, and was therefore unconstitutional as in conflict with actually
existing congressional regulations of
commerce. This was dismissed by the
court without much consideration. It
was said this law is not a regulation
of commerce, and cannot be in conflict
with any regulation of Congress, because it has not legislated upon the
subject.
"It may be said generally
that the legislation of a state not
directed against commerce or any of its
regulations, but relating to the rights,
duties and liabilities of citizens, and
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only indirectly and remotely affecting pose a new obligation and liability upon
the operations of commerce is of obli- owners of steam passenger vessels engatory force upon citizens within its gaged in inter-statc commerce, and
territorial jurisdiction, whether on land appears quite as inconsistent with the
or water, or engaged in commerce, for- Act of 1852, as the law incorporating
eign or inter-state, or in any other pur- the Wheeling bridge was obnoxious to
the commercial regulations of the river
suit. In our judgment the statute of
Indiana falls under this class. Until Ohio. We cannot help feeling, howCongress, therefore, makes some regu- ever, that the decision in that case was
lation touching the liability of parties painfully come to, and that its weight is
for marine torts resulting .in the death not increased by Gilnan v. Philaddphia,
of the persons injured, we are of opin- in which the court shows a plain union that the statute of Indiana applies, willingness to repeat the process.
The plaintiff in error appears to have
giving a right of action in such cases to
the personal representatives of the de- contended in the second place that the
ceased, and that, as thus applied it con- act should be construed as intending to
stitutes no encroachment upon the com- give a personal remedy against the
owners for all loss occasioned by the
mercial power of Congress."
It must have been pressed upon the neglect to comply with its provisions,
court that Congress might be regarded but that where the loss, all its provias having legislated upon the subject. sions being complied with, occurred
Having legislated most carefully to pre- solely through the negligence or wilful
Tent marine injuries, and having in- misconduct of the engineer or pilot,
creased the remedies for them in a way the owners should be exempted, and
that a state could not do, it might have injured parties should have their
been argued that Congress had legislated remedy against the engineer or pilot.
upon the whole subject. It did not pro- The equity of such a construction was
vide for the surviving of actions in the sought to be confirmed by the fact that
case of death to the personal represen- the statute made the employment of the
tatives, but what it omitted may have pilot compulsory : sect. 34. A case
'been as much a part of the regulation arising out of the same collision, deas what it expressed. In this case the cided by the Court of Appeals of Kenvessel was a steamer, and the jury tucky, was cited in the argument and nofound by a hysteron proteron (44 Ind. ticed in the opinion. Its title is Speigleberg'sAdm'rv.Shirley, 6-c.,butwe learn
189) that it "sunk and burned up."
Had she been a sailer no action as we that a motion for a rehearing having
have seen would have lain against the been granted, the case was compromised,
owners for any one living or dead. and, therefore, does not appear in the
Indeed the plaintiff could have had no reports. The Court of Appeals, howstanding in court at all against the de- ever, did adopt this construction in tor.
fendants if Congress had not regulated They applied the ordinary principle of
the subject of damages arising from the common law that no one should be
held responsible for the acts of another
marine torts or steam passenger vessels
in the act. If it should be admitted over whom lie has no control. But it
that Congress intended to regulate the is well settled that up to the value of
wuwle subject, then the law of Indiana, the vessel and freight, the owners are
though not a regulation of commerce, not relieved from liability for the acts
would be unconstitutional, within the -of a pilot, even if his employment is
The court in the case of
reasoning of The Wheeling Bridge case, compulsory.
2
the
supra. It certainly does seem to ira- he China, 7 Wall. 53, following
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opinion of Judge GInER, in Die Creole,
2 Wall. Jr. 519, points out that the responsibility of the vessel "is not derived from the civil law of master and
servant, nor from, the common law.
It had its source in the commercial
usages and jurisprudence of the middle
ages. Originally the primary liability
was upon the vessel, and that of the
owner was not personal, but merely incidental to his ownership from which
lie was discharged, either by the loss
of his vessel or by abandoning it to
the creditors ;" or, as the court expresses it in the principal case: "By
that law (the maritime law) the vessel
is deemed to be an offending thing, and
may he prosecuted without any reference to the adjustment of responsibility
between the owners and employees tor
the negligence which resulted in the injury." As the owners were responsible for the negligence of a compulsory
pilot up to the value of the vessel by
the maritime law, so the court considered that they would be responsible for
it in the new field of personal liability
created by the act, and they explained
the express provision about the engineer
or pilot as intended to give injured parties an additional remedy against them.
To this it might be answered that the
remedy to recover damages occasioned
by the "negligence, carelessness or
wilful misconduct" of any one in his
calling is not "additional" in the sense
of being newly conferred by Congress,

because every one had it at common
law. Nor is it additional in the sense
that any one could recover twice for the
same injury. And its presence might
quite naturally be explained as showing
an intention that the owners should not
be personally liable when theywere not
directly in fault, viz. : When all the
provisions of the act were complied
with. Besides in favor of the construction it is to be considered that the
offending vessel having been destroyed
in this case, the liability of the owners
did not exist by the maritime law at all,
but by virtue of the statute, and, therefore, the reasoning drawn from the
maritime law which concludes them up
to the value of the vessel- and freight,
might not be applicable to them in the
new field of statutory liability. On the
contrary, in this field there would seem
to be no impropriety in applying the
common law doctrine of master and
servant which made one responsible for
the acts of another, if he had the right
to control him. If the foundation of
responsibility were authority the owners
should not be held responsible for the
negligence of a minister whom they did
not choose, and could not control.
There seems to be some reason for
thinking that if in construing the Act
of 1852, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
erred in not considering maritime principles at all, the Supreme Court may
have carried them too far.
H. G. W.
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If A. pays a debt to B. by delivering him the note of C. and orally guarantees
the payment thereof, such guaranty is void under the Statute of Frauds-his own
original debt being thereby discharged.
CONTRACT upon a promise of the defendant to pay the note of
a third person to the plaintiffs, upon defqult of the promisor. The
answer set up the Statute of Frauds.
At the trial in the Superior Court, before PITMAN, J., without
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a jury, it appeared that the plaintiffs sold to the defendant certain
goods, taking in part payment his due bill, which was reduced by
subsequent payments to $200. For this balance the defendant
offered to the plaintiffs the note of one Robinson, payable to their
order, which they accepted, and at the same time they gave up the
said due bill in settlement, and he orally promised that, if the note
was not paid by Robinson at maturity, he would pay it. The
plaintiffs, after the note became due, sent it to Robinson's place of
business and residence for payment, but did not find him, and thereupon demanded payment of the defendant, who refused it. The
judge found that the plaintiffs had used due diligence in attempting to collect the note of Robinson, and that there had been due
demand upon the defendant.
The defendant requested the judge to rule that the plaintiffs
could not recover. The judge refused so to rule, and found for the
plaintiffs for the amount of the note and interest, "upon and by
reason solely of the verbal promise, which he found, as a fact, that
the defendant did make; and held and ruled that, it appearing that
the leading and immediate object of the defendant in giving and
verbally guaranteeing the note of Robinson was the payment of his
own debt, the promise was not to be considered as collateral to the
debt of another, but as creating an original obligation from the
promisor-a part of the mode and manner in which he was to pay
his own debt-and so was not within the statute, although one
effect of its performance would be to discharge Robinson's liability."
The defendant alleged exceptions.
J. B. Bichardon, for the defendant.

). B. Gove, for the plaintiffs.
GRAY, C.J.-The defendant was doubtless once liable for the

goods sold and delivered to him, and upon the due bill which, upon
paying part of the price of the goods, he gave to the plaintiffs for
the balance. But upon his procuring and delivering to them the
note of Robinson, as the bill of exceptions states, "they at the same
time gave up the -said due bill to him in settlement," and he orally
promised to pay Robinson's note at maturity, if Robinson did not.
The claim of the plaintiffs, and the finding of the court, did not
proceed upon the defendant's liability for goods sold, but solely upon
this oral promise of his, thereby necessarily assuming that his pre-
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vious liability had been settled and discharged by the giving and
receiving of the note of Robinson. Upon this state of facts, the only
direct liability was that of Robinison upon his note, and the oral
promiseof the defendant to pay that note, if Robinson did not, was
a collateral proxiise to pay Robinson's debt, and as such within the
Statute of Frauds: Gen. Stats., c. 105, § 1; Nlelson v. Boynton,
8 Mete. 896; Ames v. Boster, 106 Mass. 400; Brightman v.
Kicks, 108 Id. 246; Gill v. Herrick, 111 Id. 501.
Exceptions sustained.
of losing his debt by the insolvency of
Of course A.'s oral guaranty of B.'s
note, nothing else being shown, though his debtor, to support a suit against
given contemporaneously, is within the the friends or relatives of the debtorstatute. But in this ease quite a differ- a father, son or brother-by means of
ent element exists, viz., that the de2 false evidence, by exaggerating words
fendant, by his oral guaranty of Rob- of recommendation, encouragement to
inson's note to the plaintiff, thereby forbearance, and requests for indulprocured a release and discharge of his gence, into positive contracts." Does
own former debt to the plaintiff, and this at all arise where a debtor, in order
a surrender of his own due bill which to procure a discharge of his former
the plaintiff held against him for the sole and individual debt, procures anbalance 6f the old debt. It was this other person to become bound for him,
element, apparently, which the court and also at the same time agrees that
below held sufficient to take the defend- such third person shall fulfil this his
ant's guaranty out of the Statute of obligation I Which party, in the true
Frauds. And is there not some coun- sense and spirit of the word, is princitenance for such a view t What was pal, and which is surety? which is
the object and intention of the statute f "answering"
for his own debt, and
The language is, "No action shall be which is answering for the debt of anbrought to charge a person upon a spe- otherI
cial promise to answer for the debt, deIf the primary and leading object of
fault or misdoings of another."
Does the oral promise is to pay or cause to
not this mean when the promise is merely be paid one's own pre-existing debt, is
to answer for another's debt ? Is it it invalid merely because one indirect
within the spirit and evil of this pro- and incidental effect is also to pay what
vision for a man to promise to pay has now become the liability of anhis own debt, although in so doing he other? Why is it that it has been
also pays the obligation of another? uniformly held, both in England and
Chief Justice SHaw says, in Nedson T. America, that if A. owes B., and B.
Boynton, 3 Met. 399, "The object of
owes C. the same amount, and by conthe statute manifestly was, to secure tract of all parties A. orally agries to
the highest and most satisfactory species pay the amount to C. instead of to B.,
of evidence in a case where a party, that C. can enforce that promise against
with out apparent benefit to himself, enters 'A., notwithstanding the Statute of
into stipulations of suretyship, and Frauds ? Is it not b.-cause, in subwhere there would be great temptation stance and effect, A. is thereby payibg
on the part of a creditor, in danger his own debt, although he also at the
VOL. XXV.-60
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the decision. The only point involved
in Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Met. 396, was,
that if A. sues B. on a note, and C.
orally promises to pay the note if A.
will discontinue a suit thereon against
B. and relinquish an attachment of B.'s
property, and A. does so, still retaining
of B., and at the time of purchase gives his claim against B., this forbearance
in payment the note of C. and orally alone on the part of A., no other conguarantees the payment thereof, that sideration existing and no benefit enursuch oral guaranty is valid, as has ing to C. in any way, does not take C.'s
been repeatedly held? Yet where is promise out of the Statute of Frauds.
the material difference between that And although the point now considered
and the principal case? A promise by did not arise, yet Chief Justice SnIAw
A. that B. shall pay A.'s debt, is very uses this not inapplicable language:
farfrom a promise by A. to pay B.'s 91The terms 'original' and 'collateral
promise,' though not used in the statute,
debt.
According to many authorities, the are convenient enough to distinguish
release and surrender by the plaintiff of between the cases where the direct and
his original claim and due bill of the leading object of the promise is to bedefendant in this case would have made come the surety or guarantor of anRobinson liable on even an oral pro- other's debt, and those where, although
mise ; since parting with a valuable the effect of the promise is to pay the
right, or discharging one d&btor, is suf- debt of another, yet the leading object
ficient to make another liable who of the undertaker is to subserve or prothereupon assumes to pay it. Such mote some interest or purpose of his
loss or injury to the promisee has fre- own. The former, whether made bequently been held a sufficient founda- fore, or after, or at the same time with
tion to make the oral promise of a third the promise of the principal, is not
person a new contract an original con- valid unless manifested by evidence in
tract not within the statute. And this writing; the latter, if made on good
seems to be the law in Massachusetts. consideration, is unaffected by the staSee Walker v. Penniman, 8 Gray 233; tute, because, although the effect of it
Woods v. Corcoran, I Allen 405. If is to release or suspend the debt of anso, it would seem singular that, if a other, yet that is not the leading object
third person would be bound by his oral on the part of the promisor." Might
promise because of the relinquishment we not presume that the directly leading
of the creditor's claim on the original object of the defendant in the above case
debt, that the debtor himself should not of Dows v. Swett was not to become the
be bound by his similar promise made surety or guarantor of Robinson, but to
to the same creditor at the same time subserve some interest of his own, and
and for identically the same considera- pay his own debt ?
The only point involved in Ames v.
tion. Did the Statute of Frauds intend
Foster, 106 Mass. 400, was that an oral
such a result ?"
But how stand the authorities upon promise is void, made by a mortgagee
this question ? In the first place, it of a part of a vessel to pay the plaindoes not seem to have been passed upon tiff's bill of supplies for the vessel,
inany of the prior decisions in Massa- ordered by other parties, and for which
chusetts cited by the court in support of the defendant was in no way liable, nor
same time discharges the debt of another? Why is it that an oral promise
by one partner to pay a debt due from
the firm is not within the statute? Is
it not because he is paying his own
debt, although another is also liable for
it? Why is it that if A. buys goods
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the vessel subject to any lien therefor,
solely in consideration that the plaintiffs would not attach the interest of the
owners of the other part of the.vessel,
on which the defendant had no mortgage, the defendant deriving no benefit
from such forbearance, and the owners
still remaining liable for the debt as
before.
The point in Brightman v. hlicks, 108
Mass. 246, was that if a debtor transfers to A. personal property which is
then subject to a lien for his debt, and
A. orally agrees to pay the debt, but
the creditor neither discharges the original debtor nor releases the property
from the lien, so that A. acquires nothing as the result of his promise to
which he was not already entitled, such
oral promise is within the statute. Gill
v. Herrick, lIt Mass. 501, decides only
that if A. is building a house for B.,
and purchases materials of C., and failing to pay for thme same, B. orally promises C. that he will pay for them if C.
will go on and finish thework, and does
so, still holding A. liable for the same,
B.'s promise is invalid.
Although these cases, especially the
last, show a strong inclination to uphold the statute, they all turn upon different considerations from the one we
are now considering. Ifwe look beyond
IMassachusetts, the decisions seem to be
quite harmonious in the opposite view.
In Johnson v. Gilbert, 4 Hill 178
(1849) the defendant owed the plaintiff
twenty-five dollars, for money paid by
the plaintiff for the defendant's benefit.
In consideration of such indebtedness,
the defendant transferred to the plaintiff
the note of one Eastman for twenty-five
dollars, payable to himself, and wrote
this guaranty on the back : "1 hereby
guaranty the payment of this note,
which is $25. W. D. GILRERT," no
consideration being expressed in such
guaranty, which by the statute of New
York was necessary if a guaranty is
collateral and not an original undertaking. The Statute of Frauds was set

up as a defence. The court said (Bnovsox, J.) : " The Statute of Frauds
has nothing to do with the case. That
only applies where the person making
the promise stands in the relation of
surety for some third person who is the
principal debtor. This was not an undertaking by the defendant to pay the
debtor of Eastman, but it was an agreement to pay his own debt in a particular
way. If A. promise B., upon a sufficient consideration moving wholly between them, that a stranger will pay a
sum of money or do any other act, this
is an original undertaking, and not
within the statute; and it makes no
difference whether the stranger is under
an obligation to do the act or not."
Precisely the same decision was made,
upon a similar state of facts, in the
subsequent case of Brown v. Curtiss, 2
Comstock 225 (1849), the court saying
such a guaranty is " good without any
writing.'
And such seems to be the
settled law in New York. See Cardell
v. Ac'Neil, 21 N. Y. 336 (1860);
Rllenwoodv.Fults, 63Barb. 335 (1864);
Mallory v. Gillett, 21 N.Y. 423 (1860),
one of the very best opinions on this
question to be found on either side of
the Atlantic. And this view is not
confined to New York alone, or based
upon any peculiar views of the statute
of that state.
In Jones v. Palmer, I Doug. (Mich.)
379 (1844), A., being indebted to B.,
transferred to him, in part payment of
such indebtedness, the note of C., and
endorsed on the back a written guaranty ; and the question made was, whether the consideration thereof was sufficiently expressed therein ; but the
court held the guaranty not within the
Statute of Frauds, but an original undertaking, saying: " The defendant
was indebted to the plaintiff, and tof satisfy such indebtedness pro tanto, transferred to him the note of Dunbar, his
own debtor, and promised to guaranty
its payment. The consideration for
such promise was the discharge by the
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plaintiff of a portion of the defendant's
indebtedness to him. It was, in fact,
a promise by the defendant to pay his
own debt, and not the debt of another."
Rowland r. Rorke, 4 Jones (N. C.)
337 (1857), is similar. The defendant
owed the plaintiff $670 for a slave. He
transferred to him two notes of one E.
Ri. Guion, without endorsement, in payment, verbally agreeing that if Gnion
was not good for them at the end of six
months, "li was to make them good."
The court said : "This is not a contract
which comes within tile net for the suppression of fraud ; for though it is, in
some sense, to answer for the debt of
another, yet it is strictly the debt of the
defendant himself."
Pennylvania follows the same direction. In Malone v. Keener, 44 Penna.
St. 197 (1862), a debtor transferred to
his creditor, in part payment of his
debt, the note of a third person, and
orally guaranteed its payment. I The
court held the guaranty binding, saying: "It is a general principle in all
cases under the fourth section of the
Statute of Frauds, that whenever the
defendant's promise is in effect to pay
his own debt, though that of a third
person be incidentally guaranteed, it is
not necessary it should be in writing."
This is much like the case to which this
note is appended.
Similar principles were considered,
and with the same result, in the cases

of Adcock Y; Ft'eming, 2 De. & Bat.
225 (1837) ; Smith v. Finch, 2 Scam.
321 (1840); Emerson v. Slater, 22 How.
28 (1U59) ; Jlinitington v. 1i'dlington,
12 Mich. 10 (1863) ; Stewart r. 31alone,
5 Philadelphia 440 (1864).
Browne, on the Statute of Frauds,
says, p. 105: "It is a general principle which prevails in all cases under
this branch of the statute, that whenever the defendant's promise is, in
effect, to pay his own debt, though that
of a third person be incidentally guaranteed, it is not necessary that it should
be in writing. Tile statute contemplates
the mere promise of one man to he responsible for another, and cannot be
interposed as a cover and shield against
the actual obligations of the defendant
himself. The common case of the holder
of'a thirdperson's note assigning itfor the
value with a guaranty, seems to be clearly
referable to this principle. The assignor
owes the assignee, and that particular
mode of paying him is adopted ; he
guarantees in substance his own debt."
We have not been able to find any
decision, English or American, contrary to these views, and it would seem
therefore that the decisions in Massachusetts would have allowed, and those
elsewhere have supported, a different
conclusion from that arrived at in the
principal case, and thatthe ruling below,
rather than the exceptions thereto, might
have been sustained.
EDxuND H. BENNETT.

Supreme Court of the United States.
DAVIS, RECEIVER OF THE OCEAN NATIONAL BANK, v. HARVEY W.
BROWN ET AL.
An endorser of a promissory note is a competent witness to prove an agreement
in writing made with its holder at the time of its endorsement, that lie shall not
be held liable thereon, where the paper has not afterwards been put into circulation, but is held by the party to whom the endorsement was made.
The case of the Bank tf United States v. Dann, 6 Peters 51, explained and
qualified.
An agreement like the one mentioned above and the endorsement, taken
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together, are equivalent, so far as the holder of the note is concerned, to on
endorsement without recourse to the endorser.
The omission of endorsers on a series or notes, transferred to the holder in settlement of their own note held by him, upon an agreement in writing that they
should not be held liable on their endorsement, to set up the agreement as a
defence to an action against them, brought by the holder on two of the notes, does
not preclude them from setting up the agreement in a second action by the holder
on others of the same series of notes. The judgment in the original action does
not operate as an estoppel against showing the existence and validity of the agreement in the second action.
When a judgment in one action is offered in evidence in a subsequent action
between the same parties upon a different demand, it operates as an estoppel only
upon the matter actually at issue and determined in the original action ; and such
matter, when not disclosed by the pleadings, must be shown by extrinsic evidence.

IN error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the North-

ern District of Illinois.
This was an action against the defendants as second endorsers
upon ten promissory notes of one McOmber, made at Saratoga
Springs, in the state of New York, in June 1870, each for $500,
and payable to his order in from thirty-two to forty-one months
after date.
The defence set up to defeat the action was that the notes in suit
were transferred in June 1871, with other notes of the same party
of like amount and date, to the Ocean National Bank by the defendants, in part satisfaction of a note of their own then past due,
the balance being paid in cash, and were endorsed by the defendants as a mere matter of form, upon an agreement in writing of the
bank that they should not be held liable on their endorsements, or
be sued thereon.
On the trial, Harvey Brown, one of the defendants, was called
as a witness to prove the matters thus set up as a defence, and was
permitted, against the objection of the plaintiff, to testify to the
settlement of the note of the defendants, the transfer for that purpose
to the Ocean National Bank of the McOmber notes, and their endorsement by the defendants under the agreement of the bank not
to hold them liable as endorsers, and that this agreement was in
writing and was destroyed in the great fire at Chicago, in October
1871.
To meet and repel the defence founded upon this agreement the
plaintiff produced and gave in evidence a record of a judgment,
recovered by him against the same defendants upon two other notes
of the same party, of like amount and date as those in suit, except
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that they became due at an earlier day, which were part of the
series of notes transferred by the dcfendants to the bank, and endorsed by them in settlement of their own note, as already mentioned, and were included in the agreement as part of the same
transaction.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FIELD, J.-The questions presented for our determination relate
to the competency of the witness Brown, and the admissibility of
the evidence of the alleged agreement of the bank, and to the
operation of the judgment mentioned as an estoppel against the
defendants setting up any defence founded upon the agreement.
The objection to the witness arose from his being a party to the
notes, and as such, it is contended, that he was incompetent to impeach or discredit the same, or to show that his liability was not
such as his endorsement imported. The case of The Bank of the
United States v. Dunn, 6 Peters 51, is cited in support of this
position. There the endorser of a note had been permitted by the
court below to testify, agaiqst the objection of the plaintiff in the
action, to a verbal understanding with the cashier and president of
the bank which took the note, that lie was not to incur any responsibility, or, at least, would not be held liable on the note, until the
security pledged for its payment had been exhausted. The admission of the witness this court considered erroneous, holding that no
one who was a party to a negotiable note could be permitted by his
own testimony to invalidate it, which in that case meant that no
one could be permitted to show that a note endorsed by him was
void in its inception, or that his endorsement did not impose the
liability which the law attached to it. The opinion which announces the decision proceeds upon two grounds: 1st, that the evidence would contradict the terms of the instrument or change their
legal import; and 2d, that it would be against public policy, as
tending to destroy the credit of commercial paper, to allow one
who had given it the sanction of his name, and thus added value
and currency to the instrument, to testify that it whis executed or
endorsed by him under such circumstances as to impair his obligfation upon it.

This last position was supported by reference to the celebrated
case of W1(dtolt v. Shelley, in Durnford & East (1 Term R. 296),
decided in 1786, where the endorser of a promissory note was held
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by the King's Bench to be iniadmissible as a witness, on grounds
of publie policy, to prove the note void for usury in its inception
Lord MANSFIELD observing that it was " of consequence to mankind that no person should hang out false colors to deceive them,
by first affixing his signature to a paper, and then afterwards giving
testimony to invalidate it." Aside from the assumed estoppel of
the parties from their position on the paper, the maxim of the loman law, that no one alleging his own turpitude shall be heard (nemo
allegmis suam turpitudinen est audiendits), was cited to justify the
decision. That maxim was plainly misapplied here by the great
chief justice, for it is not a rule of evidence, but a rule applicable
to parties seeking to enforce rights founded upon illegal or criminal
considerations.' The meaning of the maxim is that no one shall be
heard in a court of justice to allege his own turpitude as a foundation of a claim or right; it does not import that a man shall not
be heard who testifies to his own turpitude or criminality; however
much his testimony may be discredited by his character.
The doctrine of Walton v. Shelley maintained its position in the
courts of England only for a few years. In 1798 it was by the
same court overruled in the case of Jordainev. Eashbrookc, 7 Term
R. 601, Lord KENYON having succeeded MANSFIELD as chief justice. Since then, the rule has prevailed in the courts of that country, that a party to an instrument, whether negotiable or not, if
otherwise qualified, is competent to prove any fact affecting its
validity; the objection to the witness from his connection with the
making or circulation of the instrument only going to his credibility and not to his competency. In this country there has been
much diversity of opinion upon the point, some of the state courts
following the rule of Walton v. Shelley, while others have adopted
the later English rule. The general tendency of decisions here is
to disregard all objections to the competency of witnesses, and to
allow their position and character to affect only their credibility.
This diversity of opinion could not have existed unless there were
grave reasons for doubting the soundness of the original decision.
Be that as it may, it has led those courts which, on considerations
of commercial policy, adopted the rule of Wialton v. Shelley, to
qualify the rule, so as to limit its application strictly to cases arising on negotiable bills and notes; and to cases where the transaction affecting the validity of the paper was not between the parties
in suit. The holders of commercial paper who enter into agree-
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ments or transactions with the makers or endorsers, affecting its
valility or negotiability, cannot invoke protection against the infirniitv which they have aided to create. There are no consideratiolis of commercial policy which can exclude the parties in such
cases fi'om testifying to the facts. Thus, in Pox v. Whitney, 16
Mass. 118, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, which had previously recognised the rule in J1ralton v. MSelley, held that the rule
applied only to a case where a man by putting his name to a negotiable security had given currency and credit to it, and did not
apply to a case between original parties, where the paper had not
been put into circulation, and each of the parties was cognisant
of all the facts. This decision meets our concurrence, and if it
qualifies the decision in the case of Bank v. Dunn, we think the
qualification a just and proper one.
These considerations dispose of the objection to the competency
of the witness, Brown. The notes of McOmber were never put
into circulation by the Ocean National Bank. No one, therefore,
has been misled by the endorsement of the defendants; no false colors having been held out by them. No credit or currency has been
given by their name. The receiver has, with reference to the notes,
no greater right than the bank has; lie stands in its shoes. If the
bank could not have enforced a liability upon the defendants against
its agreement that they should not be .held liable, the receiver cannot enforce it. The agreement itself is not immoral nor illegal. The
defendants by their act ran the risk of being charged upon the
notes; they would have been liable had the notes been put into
circulation. "But beyond this risk they were protected by the
agreement; upon that they could rely so long as the bank held the
notes.
The objection that the agreement was inadmissible because it
tended to vary and destroy the legal effect of the endorsement is
not tenable. The agreement being in writing is to be taken and
considered in connection with the endorsement, and the two are
to be construed together. So far as the bank was concerned, the
agreement made the endorsement equivalent to one without recourse
to the endorsers.
The next question for determination relates to the operation of
the judgment recovered by the plaintiff against the defendants, as
an estoppel against their setting up the defence founded upon the
agreement. The action in which that judgment was recovered was
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brought in the same court as the present action, against the defendants as second endorsers upon two notes, whiuh were part of the
series of McOmber notes, transferred to the bank of the defendants
in settlement of their own note; and their endorsement was cmbraced in its agreement. The defendants pleaded the general issue,
but the court finds that, by the advice of counsel learned in the
law, they defended the action in good faith solely upon the ground
that their liability had not been fixed as endorsers by due prosecution of the makers of the notes, as required by the laws of Illinois ;
and that this defence was not sustained for the reason that it appeared that the makers of the notes resided in the state of New
York, and that the endorsement was made there. The agreement
of the bank not to hold them liable as endorsers was not pleaded
nor relied upon, yet it is contended by counsel that inasmuch as it
might have been thus pleaded and relied upon, therefore the judgment is an estoppel against the setting up of that agreement as a
defence in a subsequent action between the same parties upon other
notes, equally as if its validity and efficacy had been litigated and
determined.
In taking this position counsel have confounded the operation
of a judgment upon the demand involved in the action, in which
the judgment was rendered, with its operation as an estoppel in
another action between the parties upon a different demand. So
far as the demand involved in the action is concerned, the judgment has closed all controversy; its validity is no longer open to
contestation, whatever might have been said or proved at the trial
for or against it. The judgment is not only conclusive as to what
was actually determified respecting such demand, but as to every
matter which might have been brought forward and determined respecting it; and that is all that the language means which is quoted
by counsel from opinions in adjudged cases, in seeming consonance
with his position.
When a judgment is offered in evidence in a subsequent action
between the same parties upon a different demand, it operates as an
estoppel only upon the matter actually at issue and determined in
the original action; and such matter, when not disclosed by the
pleadings, must be shown by extrinsic evidence. We have recently
had occasion, in the case of Cromwell v. Sac County, not yet
reported, to go over this ground and point out the distinction
VOL. XXV.-61
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mentioned; and it is unnecessary to repeat what we there said.
(See Bigelow on Estoppel; note to the case of the -Duchess of
Kingston, in Smith's Leading Cases; and Robinson's Practice, vol.
7.) The position of counsel is clearly untenable.
As to the objection of want of authority in the president of the
bank to make the agreement with the defendants, the finding of the
court is conclusive. His authority was a fact to be determined by
the court, nder the stipulations waiving a jury, and we do not sit

in review of questions of fact.
CLIFF-ORD,

Judgment affirmed.

J., dissented.
Supreme Court of ilicigan.

EDWARD E. KANE ET AL. v. JAMES E. CLOUGII ET AL.
A mere possibility, such as the earning of wages from a future employment,
for which there is no existing contract, is not assignable.
But where there is an existing contract for employment, the possibility is
coupled with an interest, and is therefore a vested right which may be assigned.
Where the employment is to do piece-work, without any definite contract for its
continuance, but under the expcctation, on the part of employer and employee,
that it will be continuous, an assignment of wages to be earned is valid, and the
assignee will take precedence of an attaching creditor of the assignor.

TiS was a suit by garnishee process to recover of defendants
a sum owing by them to one Tucker, of whom the plaintiffs
were judgment creditors. The garnishee process was served December 9th 1875. On the 16th of October 1874, Tucker was employed by the defendants, doing piece-work in the manufacture of
organs, but without any definite contract for the continuance of the
employment. Being then indebted to his mother for money loaned,
lie executed to her an assignment of all the wages that might thereafter become due to him from the defendants. Between that date
and December 9tlt following, $65.50 had become due to him, which
was less than lie was then owing to his mother. It was this sum
which was now in dispute; the plaintiffs claiming that the assignmentcould not reach it, because the moneys were not earned when the
assignment was made, and there was no subsisting contract under
which they were to be earned.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
has often been decided that a mere possibility
COOLEY, C. J.-It
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is not the subject of assignment; a contingent claim against a forcign country, to damages to be recovered by treaty, is an illustration: Trasse v. (1omeyys, 4 Wash. 0. 0. 570. A sale of fish thereafter to be caught, passes no title when they are caught: Low v.
Pew, 108 Mass. 347. The same is held of a sale of sums to be
earned by a physician in specified future years: Skipper v. Stokes,
42 Ala. 255 ; and see Purcell v. Masher, 35 Ala. 570. In Massachusetts an assignment of future services, there being no existing
contract of service, has been held invalid; but .cases are cited in
the same state which hold that if the assignor is at the time under
a contract of service, it is maintainable: _4fulhtall v. Quin, 1 Gray
105; see also 1Hartley v. Tapley, 2 Gray 565. An officer may
assign his salary, though removable at any time: Brackett v. Blake,
7 Met. 835. In Pennsylvania an assignment which professes to
transfer a debt to arise for wages not yet earned, against any one
by whom the assignor may thereafter be employed, is held to be
ineffectual even after the wages are earned: Jermyn. v. Moffitt, 75
Penna. St. 899. In New Hampshire it is decided that wages to
become due may be effectually assigned, provided there is at the
time an existing contract under which they are to be earned: Gareaud v. .arrington, 51 N. I. 409. The like conclusion is reached
in Connecticut: Hawley v Bristol, 39 Conn. 26; Augur v. New
York, fc., Co., 39 Conn. 536. The distinction between the cases
in which the wages are not earned under a contract existing at the
time of the assignment, and those in which they are, is said to be
that "in the former the future earnings are a mere possibility coupled with no interest, while in the latter the possibility of future earnings is coupled with an interest, and the right to them, though contingent and liable to be defeated, is a vested right :" Low v. Pew,
108 Mass. 347, 350.
But an assignment of demands having no actual existence,
though invalid at law, may be valid in equity as an agreement, and
take effect as an assignment when the demands intended are subsequently brought into existence: Old v. New York, 6 New York
179; Mitchell v. Winslow, 2 Story C.C. 630, 638. And in this
case the assignee would have had a plain right, we think, to protect
her interest under the assignment to the extent to which the wages
were earned, if the sum had been sufficient to give the Court of
Chancery jurisdiction. And it is worthy of consideration whether,
under the garnishee laws, it was the intention to permit the creditor
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to reach demands to which the debtor had no equitable right, even
though his legal title had not beeni parted with, or to force the equitable owner into a suit in equity for the protection of his rights.
iBut we are inclined to think this case ought not to be distinguished from those in which the wages were earned under continuous contract. The defendant was employed at thle time tile assignment was madle. It is true he might never have received more
work, but the expectation of continuous work existed on the part of
employer and employed. The proposed transfer had reference to
wages to be earned in an existing employment, and in this it differed from that in 31tdhall v. Quin, supra, where the defendant
only performed jobs occasionally. It differs still more decidedly
fiom those cases in which no particular employment was in view,
in making the assignment. We do not see why a continuous emplovment at piece-work should differ fiom any other continuous
employment, if in the latter the right to discharge at will exists.
The substantial difference in the two cases is not in the continuance
of employment or in the expectation thereof, but in the manner of
determining the compensation. Future wages no more exist potentially in the one case than in the other.
The judgment must be affirmed, with costs.

Supreme Court of Kansas.
THE CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILROAD CO. v.
THOMAS DOYLE.
'Where a party demurs to the evidence of a plaintiff on a trial, which demurrer
is overruled by the District Court, and afterwards both parties proceed with the
case and produce other evidence, and sufficient evidence is introduced to make out
a case for the plaintiff, and on the verdict of a jury judgment is rendered in favor
of the plaintiff, time Supreme Court will not reverse the ruling of the District Court
overruling such demurrer.
The court does not err in overruling such demurrer, whenever there is testimony,
which although weak and inconclusive, yet fairly tends to.prove every essential
fact and. is sufficient to justify a court in overruling a motion to set aside a verdict
based thereon.
Where a party executes a paper, purporting to be a written release, discharging
his right of action against a railroad company for injuries complained of, and at
the said time lie is so much under the influence of drugs and opiates taken to alleviate his pains, caused by a broken thigh, that he is mentally incapacitated to contract, such a release is voidable and not a defence to his cause of action.
Iu such case it was not necessary for him to pay back, nor offer to pay back, the
money received at the time of signing said paper, as a condition precedent to his
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right to sue ol lik claim fir danimges.

On the trial, the juiry had the right to give

the company credit for the money paid at the time the releasc, so called, was

signed.
In an action by an employee against his employer for injuries caused by the
latter's
negligence of a fellow servant, an allegation that the employer knew of tile
unfitness and recklessness is sustained by proof that such incompetency ought to
have been known by the defendant. Where the employee is so grossly and notoriously unfit that not to know of his unfitness is negligence, the law presumes notice
t:o
the employer.

ERROR from Leavenworth County District Court.

M. A. Low and Clouglt ,&Wieat, for plaintiff in error.
Taylor J- Gilipateriek,for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered April 17th 1877, by
HORTON, C. J.-This was an action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been received by defendant in error
through the negligence of the plaintiff in error in knowingly employing and retaining an incompetent, reckless and unfit servant, and
in providing an unsafe and unsuitable hand-car. The petition states
in substance that plaintiff in error was a corporation organized under
the laws of Illinois, and was, on the day of the injury therein complained of, operating a line of railroad, extending from Leavenworth, Kansas, east through the county of Platte, in the state of
Missouri; that defendant in error was employed by one Kirwin to
work in connection with an extra gang of track repairers under
said Kirwin, in repairing the track of the railroad in Platte county;
that as foreman of this gang of men, Kirwin had full power to ]tire
and discharge the laborers so under his control ; that Kirwin was a
reckless, careless man, entirely unfit to have charge and control of
men, and utterly unfit for his position, and then follows this allegation, viz. :-"And plaintiff alleges that said defendant knew that said Kirwin
was a reckless, careless and incompetent man, and that he was
utterly unfit for the position he occupied. That said defendant knew
these facts at the time of the occurring of the injury hereinafter stated,
and had had full knowledge of such facts for a long time prior to
the occurring of such injuries, to wit, for the space of two years,
more or less. And that defendant knowing said Kirwin to be a
reckless, careless man, and one utterly unfit to have charge of men
upon a railroad, and after full knowledge of his reckless and care-
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less character had

)een 1rought home to it, continued said Kirwin
in its emlployment as foreman as aforesaid, and gave him charge of
a n or
of miie on said road ; and that said defendant wilfully, carelc.sly and negligently continued and retained said Kirwin in its
e:ni)loy after it had full knowledge of his unfitness for his said positioln,
and of his reckless and careless character; and that said defendant had so retained and continued said Kirwin in its employment
at the time of the occurring of the wrongs and injuries hereinafter
stated, and after knowledge of his said careless and reckless character for a long space of time, to wit, one year, more or less."
The petition further states that the company employed Kirwin
cart.lessly and negligently, with full knowledge that he was a careless, reckless man, and one unfit to have charge of men ; that Doyle
did not know of the unfitness of Kirwin until after lie received the
injuries complained of; that through the recklessness of said Kirwin
in running and conducting a hand-car, upon which Doyle and his
fellow servants were proceeding to their work, in said Platte county,
and while in said county, the hand-car was thrown from the track,
whereby Doyle received the injuries complained of. It was also
charged that the hand-car was defective ; but as the jury found for the
company on that issue it will not be necessary to consider it here.
The railroad company answered, denying generally the allegations of the petition and afterwards filed a supplemental answer,
setting up a sixth ground of defence, in which it pleaded a written
release, executed by said Doyle, releasing his right of action for the
injuries complained of, if any lie had.
To the answer of the company a general denial of all new matter
was filed by Doyle, and also a verified reply to the sixth ground
of defence, denying the execution of the instrument for the purposes set forth on its face, alleging that Doyle made his mark to
the same, if lie did make his mark to it, believing it was simply a
receipt for wages. That at the time he was not in his right mind,
was suffering intensely from pain and laboring under the influence
of drugs, opiates, &c., taken to alleviate his pain and suffering; was
not in a condition to know what lie was doing, but supposed it was
a pay-roll. On the trial, after defendant in error had introduced
his evidence and rested, the plaintiff in error demurred to the evidence on the ground that no cause of action was proven, which
denmurrer the court. overruled. The jury returned a general ver-
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dict for defendant inerror, and assessed his d;unagcs a t one thousand
dollars; and answered particular questiois of fact submitted to theiii.

The plaintiff in error filed its motion fbr a new trial, which being
overruled it moved the court for judgment on the verdict and special findings. This motion was overruled and judgment entered
on the general verdict for Doyle, to which actions of the court the
company duly excepted, and now brings the case here by petition
inerror.
1. As both parties proceeded with the trial and introduced further and additional evidence, after the demurrer to the evidence by
plaintiff in error had been overruled, we do'not think it necessary
to discuss the question of allegc(l error in the action of the court
below in overruling such demurrer: SimpJson v. liimberlin, 12
Kans. 579.
We have recently held that "as sustaining a,demurrer to evidence works a final disposition of the case, the court does not err in
overruling such a demurrer, whenever there is testiluony which
although weak and inconclusive, yet fairly tends to prove every
essential fact and is sufficient to justify a court in overruling a
motion to set aside a verdict based thereon :" Kansas Paeificlailway Company v. Couse (not yet reported). See also Jansen v. The
City of Atchinson, 17 Kans. 358.
2. Error is alleged that the reply to the sixth ground of defence
is wholly insufficient to avoid tie effect of the release; we think

otherwise. If Doyle was in the condition stated in that part of the
reply, lie was incapacitated to contract with the railroad company.
He could give no sufficient assent to the release. Assuming, as the
reply states, that lie was laboring under intense suffering and was
unable to move or turn himself; that his mind was wandering and
that he was under the control of drugs and medicines taken to subdue
and ease his sufferings and in no condition to know what l1e was
doing; it would not only be inequitable, but against authority to
hold him responsible for a settlement made by him in writing with
the company for his personal injuries for the sum of $33. The
decisions are manifold that contracts entered into when, from intoxication, the party was incompetent to contract, may be avoided. In
the case at bar, the reasons are very much stronger for holding,
if Doyle signed the release, as he sets forth in his reply, that lie
should not be bound thereby. In the case of intoxication, the party
inexcusably, "drinks, forgets the law and perverts his judgment ;"
in this case, Doyle, with a broken thigh, lying in a hospital on 3i

488

CHICAGO, &c., RAILROAD CO. r. DOYLE.

cot, and so affected that he. could only turn with great difficulty,
naturally demanded opiates to assuage his sufferings, and if he used
them either to excess or witheut the knowledge of his nurse or
physician, his act in so doing is at least excusable, perhaps fully
justifiable.
if lie was not competent to contract, and of this the jury had the
right, under the evidence, to judge, then the release was not effective.
Counsel for the petitioner in error, however, insist that unless Doyle
offered to rescind the contract, and pay back the money received,
the release is binding and he could not recover in the case, and
claim that the charge of the court, which directed the jury to give
the company credit for the money paid for the release, provided
Dole did not intend to execute it, was erroneous. In support of
this proposition, they say " It gave him the privilege of rescinding
the contract without surrendering the consideration received. It
gave him permission to play the game of ' head I win, tail you lose,'
a doctrine that is seldom sanctioned in a court of justice. A court
of equity can reform a contract only in case of a mutual mistake.
In this case, while it is claimed that Doyle was mistaken, there is
no pretence that there was any mistake on the part of the company.
It is well settled that a mistake of one of the parties to a contract
is not enough to authorize a court to reform it."
The argument is faulty, in that it assumes that Doyle made a
contract, and, also, seems to assume that before bringing his suit lie
had knowingly ratified the release. If Doyle's theory is correct
there was no release, no contract, no ratification within his knowledge. He signed a writing which was voidable for want of capacity
on his part to execute. Not until the suit was tried, was he fully
informed of the circumstances under which he made his mark thereto, and hence, we hold that under the facts stated in such reply it
was not necessary for him to tender the money buck, nor did the
court below commit error in instructing the jury, if they found for
Doyle, to give the company credit for the $33 paid him at the time
the release, so called, was signed. If Doyle was incompetent to
understand or know the character of the paper signed by him, owing
to his being under the influence of opiates to surcease his pains,
and such paper was never afterwards read or explained to him, it
cannot be reasonably said that he affirmed the instrument, which he
did not in the first instance assent to and never afterwards saw or
knew of, until lie met it on the trial.
3. It is alleged that the motion for judgment for the railroad
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company ought to have been sustained. In addition to tie general
finding by the jury for Doyle, the following particular quw stions
of fact, among others, were also submitted to them and answered :4CQ. Was the John Kirwin mentioned in the petition in this
action incompetent or unfit to occupy or hold the position of foreman of such a gang of men as he was foreman of at the time wieni
plaintiff was injured ?
A. We believe lie was competent, but unfit to hold the position.
Q. Was the John Kirwin mentioned in the petition in this action
so careless or reckless as not to be a fit person to occupy the position he held at the time when plaintiff was injured ?
A. We believe lie was too reckless."
With these special facts so found, together with the general verdict for the plaintiff in the court below, the allegations in the petition, that the railroad company was liable for the negligent injuries
inflicted by Kirwin upon Doyle, are fully sustained, unless some
special finding of fact is inconsistent with the general verdict.
Counsel for plaintiff in error claims that the following question and
answer, viz. :"Did any of the officers or agents of defendant know that John
Kirwin was not an ordinarily competent and careful person for the
performance of the service in which he was engaged at the time of
the accident to plaintiff, complained of, if so, what officers and
agents ; what is the name of each of such officers and agents ?
A. There is not evidence to show whether they did or did not
know"-is a finding that the railroad company had no notice of the
unfitness and recklessness of Kirwin, and therefore, that said
finding is inconsistent with the general verdict, and as the former
controls the latter, the court should have given judgment accordingly. Counsel insisting upon this construction of the finding last
named, concede that there are four cases in which an employer will
be liable to an employee for negligent injuries inflicted by a coemployee :1. Where the employment was without duo inquiry as to the
employee's fitness; 2. Where the employment is with notice of the
employee's unfitness; 3. Where the employee is continued in service with notice of his unfitness; 4. Where the employee is so
grossly and notoriously unfit that not to know of his unfitness is
negligence; in such a case notice will be presumed. The finding
VOL. XXV.-62
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relied upon to defeat the verdict, is to the effect that no particular
officer or agent of the railroad company knew that Kirwin was not
an ordinarily competent and careful person. Does this finding rebut
the presumption of thc law, that notice will be presumed where the
employee is so grossly and notoriously unfit that not to know of his
unfitness is negligence ? *We think not. If it was the intention of
the special finding to meet also this charge or allegation, then another
and entirely different inquiry should have been given to the jury.
If Kirwin was retained by the railway company, after it should
have known his unfitness and recklessness, the company actually
had in law notice of such unfitness and recklessness, although neither
the court nor the jury could amne any officer or agent of the corlany in the possession of such knowledge. Hence, the fact that
the jury virtually said that the evidence did not point out any officer
or agent of the company who knew Kirwin's unfitness and recklessness, did not in any manuer do away with the notice presumed by
the law. If the circumstances of the case were such as that, in the
judgment of the jury, the railway company did not actually know
of the unfitness of Kirwin, and nevertheless ought to have known
it, it is the same as if the company had such actual notice. Every
presumption is in favor of the general verdict, and the court will
presume that every fiet was found, which there was evidence tending to prove, that is necessary to support such verdict, and a general
finding in favor of Doyle, is a finding in his favor of all the facts
necessary to constitute his claim. The question then arises whether
the allegations in the petition authorized the proof of such acts of
negligence on the part of Kirwin as would make it negligent in the
railway company not to know of his unfitness, and thus be bound
in law with notice ; in other words, does the charge that the railroad
company wilfully, carelessly and negligently continued and retained
said Kirwin in its employ, after it had full knowledge of his unfitness for his position, and of his reckless and careless character, and
such knowledge had been brought home to it, permit Doyle to show
that the company ought to have known of such incompetency, and
thus have actual knowledge in law? We think it does. The petition charges actual knowledge, and thereunder evidence could have
been offered, showing that the unfitness and recklessness of Kirwin
were known or ought to have been known by the railway company.
The obligation of the former tenders the same issue as the latter, and
opens the door to every inquiry in relation to it. The petition
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would sustain a finding that the railroad company ought to have
known the unfitness and recklessness of Kirwin. and in law had notice
thereof. A state of fitets proven which show that the railway company ought to have knowledge of the conduct of an employee
presumes notice and is evidence of notice. As to the other matters
submitted in favor of sustaining the motion for judgment for plaintiff in error, it is sufficient to say that the general verdict fully
covers all of said objections, and that the court committed no error in
overruling the same.
In this case the evidence was very conflicting upon every material
point, excepting as to the injuries received by Doyle, yet as there
was testimony tending to support the verdict which would be sufficient therefor, if it was not contradicted by other testimony, and as
the District Court has approved the verdict, we cannot reverse the
judgment and order a new trial on the ground that the verdict is
not sustained by sufficient evidence. Our view of the weight of
evidence might differ very widely from that of the trial jury, but
we have no right to usurp their powers, after a trial judge has approved their verdict: The American Bridge Co. v. lJMurphey, 13
Kans. 35, and the authorities there cited.
The judgment of the court below will be affirmed, all the justices
concurring.
United States -DistrictCourt. Southern Districtof New York.
CHARLES II. 3,ARSIIALL AND OTHERS v. THE STEAMSHIP
ADRIATIC.
While it is in general the duty of a steamer to keep out of the way of a sailing
vessel, it is, on tle other hand, equally the duty of the latter to allow the steamer
to keep out of her way and not to embarrass or hamper her in so doing.
A steamer going at twelve knots and a sailing ship going about eight or nine
knots, approached each other upon opposite courses, in such position that the
ship's green light only was visible from the steamer at about two points on her
starboard bow ; the steamer kept on her course without change for four minutes,
until the ship's green light had opened to three and a half' points on the steamer's
starboard bow, when the ship shut in her green light and exposed her red, whereupon tle steamer ported her helm and slowed ; in about a minute and while the
steamer was swinging to starboard under her port helm, the ship shut in her red
light and again exposed only the green, whereupon the steamer reversed her
engines, but not in time to avoid a collision. Licld, that the ship was entirely in
fault.
Under such circumstances where the vacillating course of one vessel imposes on
tie other, a second or third time, the duty of avoiding her, and the danger of col-
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liqion is imminent, very much must be conceded to the judgment of the navigator
of the latter, and lie shouh not be held in fault for hiu course unless it is shown
that it was such as to indicate that there was no fair exercise of reasonable judgment and skill in adopting it.

I, admiralty. On the 30th of December 1875, the ship Harvest
Queen, an American vessel, belonging to the libellants, with a cargo
on board also belonging to them, set sail from the harbor of Queenstown, in Ireland, for Liverpool, in England. The steamer Adriatic,
a British vessel, sailed from Liverpool for New York on the same
day, and proceeded down the Irish Channel. The libel alleged
that when the ship was distant about fifty miles from her place of
departure, and was proceeding up the Irish Channel, the wind
blowing a stiff breeze from about souL -west, and the weather being
clear starlight, she was run into by .he steamer at about three
o'clock A. M., on the 31st of December, the steamer striking the
ship on her port bow, with such violence as to cause her, with her
cargo, to sink in a very short time after the collision; that, by said
collision, the ship was totally lost, and her master and officers and
all hands on board of her were lost; that, prior to, and at the time
of the collision, the general course of the ship was up, and the
general course of the steamer was down, the Irish Channel, and
their courses crossed but slightly, if at all; and that the collision
was caused by the negligence and improper conduct of those on
board of the steamer, in not having a good and sufficient look-out,
in running at too great a rate of speed, in not keeping out of the
way of the ship, and in not stopping and backing in time to avoid
the collision. The libellants claimed to recover against the steamer,
as damages sustained by the collision, the sum of $225,000.
The answer of the steamer averred that the ship was either sunk
by a collision with some other vessel than the steamer, in the Irish
Channel, on or about the 3 1st of December, or was wrecked on or
about that day in said Channel, and that her loss was caused
thereby, and not by any collision with the steamer.
Twomas B. Stillman and Henry J. Scudder, for libellants.
.Everett P. Mieeler and Josep~h H. Choate, for claimants.
BLATCIIrORD, J.-Without discussing in detail the evidence, it
is sufficient to say that it leaves no doubt in the mind that the
steamer, at or about the time and place charged, came into collision
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with the ship Harvest Queen, belonging to the libellants, in such
manner and with such results as to cause the sinking and loss of
the ship and of her cargo, and of every person on board of her.
The material question in the case to be determined on the evidence is, as to whether the steamer was in fault. The vessels were
sailing on nearly opposite courses. The steamer was heading from
.west one-quarter north to west one-half north. The ship was heading about east by south half south. They were thus drawing on to
the courses of each other from one point to one point and a quarter.
The ship was sailing at the rate of from eight to nine knots an hour
and the steamer at the rate of about twelve knots. The steamer
made the green light of the ship at about two points on the starboard bow of the steamer. The red light of the ship was not then
visible to the steamer. The white and green lights of the steamer,
and not her red light, ought then to have been visible to the ship,
and undoubtedly were, and it was her duty to hced them. Under
the circumstances thus existing it was the duty of the steamer to
keep out of the way of the ship, and it was the correlative duty of
the ship to allow the steamer to keep out of her way, and not to
embarrass or hamper the steamer in performibg such duty. The
position was one of safety. The green lights of the two vessels,
and only those, were exposed to each other. There was no exposing of green to red. Under this condition of things the steamer
kept on her course, neither porting nor starboarding, nor slowing,
nor stopping, nor reversing. It was proper for her so to keep on
her course. She had a right to presume that in the presence of
her exposed green light, the ship would continue to expose her
green light and that only. There was no obligation on the steamer
then to starboard, because the vessels were at such a distance apart,
probably two miles, that if both kept their courses, the ship was
certain: to pass clear, on the starboard band of the steamer. She
would draw more and more on the starboard bow of +" ; steamer.
And such was the fact. The ship's green light opened more to the
starboard of the steamer, until it got to be some three and a half
points on the starboard bow of the steamer. This was a position
of safety. The ship would not reach the path of the steamer until
she was astern of the steamer. At this juncture, and some four
minutes after the ship's green light had first been seen by the
steamer, the ship shut in her green light, and exposed her red
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All tle lime before that she had exposed her green light.
Here
theii ar'ose an exigency. HIere was danger. The first officer (if
the steamer. 'Mr.Bence, was on her bridge, watching the green
light off his starboard bow. lie had charge of the steamer at the
time. and was responsible for her navigation. Ile had seen the.
green light for four minutes, and had sen it thus open more on his
starboard bow. lie could not tell to what species of craft it belonged, whether to a fire and aft vessel, which could sail within
five points of the wind, or to a square-rigged vessel, which could
not sail nearer to the wind than from six to seven points. He saw
a movement in the approaching vessel, indicated by the change in
her lights, which it was reasonable and proper for him, under the
circumstances, to take as evidence of her intention to throw herself across his onward path. lie was called upon suddenly and in
an exigency, to determine whether he would do anything and, if
something, wliat. lie could, as to the course of his vessel, do one
of three tlihigs-either let it remain as it was, or starboard, or port.
Ile ported. The libellants insist tlhat lie erred in porting; that,
if he had not ported, there would have been no collision; that lie
ought to have starboarded, or at least have kept on the same course;
that if lie had even kept his course there would have been no collision. as the ship could not have reached his path ahead of him
and tlat if hie had starboarded lie would certainly have sailed away
from all danger. It is easy to criticise and to be wise after the
event. Mr. Bence seems to have been a good seaman, of experience
anti capacity; watclfil, thoughtful, and deliberate. Much must
be left to the judgment of such a man, charged with the safety of a
large steamer, and of the lives of those on board, as to which one
of two or more methods lie will adopt in a given exigency, if it is
not shown that the one he adopted was such as to indicate that
there was no fidr exercise of reasonable judgment in concluding to
adopt it. By determining to port and throw the head of the
steamer to starboard, 'Mr. Bence took a course which would certainly, if the approaching vessel continued to display only her red
light, er" soon bring the two vessels on parallel courses, with
their red lights exposed to each other. That was safety. To take
that course was prudent, and, at the distance apart the two vessv(ls
were, it would have been successful, if the ship had continued to
and tait Alone, steadily, *witl, no glinipse of her red light.
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expose only her red light. The steamer's duty of avoiding the
ship did not cease because the ship shut in her green light and exposed her red light. It continued in the altered circumstances.
As the exigency was sudden and unforeseen, and as the vessels
were nearing each other rapidly, promptness of decision and action
on the part of steamer was necessary. Even if the ship had continued to expose only her red light, the steamer might, it may be
conceded, have passed her in safety by going on at the same speed
as before, without starboarding or with starboarding. But I think
it quite clear that if the ship had continued to expose only her red
light, the steamer would, having ported, have equally avoided a
collision with the ship, especially as, on the weight of the evidence,
the steamer's engines were slowed at the time her helm was ported.
The steamer adopted this manoeuvre of porting and slowing deliberately and wisely. There was no apparent necessity at that time
that she should stop and reverse her engines. She discharged her
duty of avoiding the ship by proper movements, for the second time.
She did this, although the ship was in fault in her movements, in
the presence of what she could and should have seen was a steamer.
These movements of the steamer had been made, and she was
swinging to starboard, under her port helm, when the ship shut
in her red light, and exposed only her green light. Seeing this
confusion of purpose in the ship, the engines of the steamer were
stopped and reversed at full speed. This was proper. There was
nothing else for the steamer to do. The ship had twice turned
from a course and position in reference to which the steamer had
acted, and acted in a way which would have given safety to the
ship.
Whatever followed, the ship had brought upon herself. For what
ensued after the ship exhibited her green light the second time the
steamer was not responsible. Before the collision the ship made
another change, and shut in her green light, and showed only her
red light.
A strenuous effort was made on the part of the libellants to induce
the belief that the changes by the ship from green to red and from
red back to green were produced by the yawing of the ship in the
following sea and with the free wind." But it is impossible to believe
this, for the green light was visible at first, alone, for four minutes,
continuously, with no glimpse of the red light, and the green light
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(;pened friom two points on the starboard bow of the steamer to three
anod a half points on the same bow before the red light appeared.
The effects of yawing would have been sooner observed.
It is earnestly contended, for the libellants, that the red light
of the ship, because of which the steamer ported, was in sight for
only one minute, and that when the green light of the ship again
appeared, the steamer should have kept going ahead, and should
have starboarded. The ship was a third time, and in a third position,
imposing on the steamer the duty of avoiding her, after the steamer
had twice assumed and discharged that duty. The distance between
the vessels was diminishing fast, and with this erratic vessel nearly
ahead, and the danger of collision apparent and imminent, it was
the highest duty of the steamer to stop and reverse her engines.
She did so, and her engines were reversed at full speed, and, on
the evidence, she had got sternway on at the time of the collision.
If it were to be conceded that the stopping and reversing was an
error ofjudgnment, it could not be held to have been a fault, occurring, as it did, after what had previously happened, but would be
regarded as an error which the libellants could not make a ground
of complaint. But it is not to be admitted that it was an error of
judgment.
Although the court is asked to condemn the movements of the
steamer, no testimony of any expert in seamanship or in navigation
is adduced to show that such movements were faulty, or unwise, or
imprudent, or unintelligent. The case of the libellants seems to
rest on the proposition that it was the duty of the steamer to keep
out of the way of the ship, and that it is not established that the
ship changed her course. But the steamer could act only in view
of what she saw, and of what she had a right reasonably to infer
from what she saw. Her movements were taken with a reasonable
certainty that they would give safety to both vessels. She exercised
the highest degree of diligence imposed by the law, in her efforts
to avoid the ship. She exercised that diligence discreetly throughout to the end, in all the emergencies which the vacillating movements of the ship threw upon her.
The libel is dismissed with costs.

